The China–Russia partnership is frequently projected as a durable counterweight to the Western-led global order. Described as a “no-limits” alignment, it is often assumed to provide economic resilience against sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Yet a closer geoeconomic reading reveals a more complex reality: growing economic interdependence has made Russia structurally dependent on China, turning alignment into asymmetry—and creating strategic consequences for India.
In geoeconomics, power lies less in declarations and more in leverage over markets, technology, and finance. On all three counts, China now holds the upper hand.
Russia’s Eastward Pivot and the Cost of Dependence
Western sanctions following the Ukraine conflict have forced Russia to redraw its economic map. Shut out of European energy markets and advanced Western technologies, Moscow has pivoted decisively eastward. China has emerged as Russia’s largest trading partner, principal energy buyer, and key supplier of manufactured goods and industrial inputs.
This shift has come at a price. Russian oil and gas are sold to China at discounted rates, while transactions increasingly move into yuan, deepening Russia’s dependence on Chinese financial infrastructure. Energy, once Russia’s geopolitical instrument, is now a source of vulnerability. China, meanwhile, treats Russian supplies as diversification rather than necessity, retaining strong bargaining power.
Defence–Industrial Spillovers: India’s Quiet Concern
This economic asymmetry has spillover effects in the defence domain—an area of direct relevance to India. For decades, India’s defence partnership with Russia has rested not just on procurement but on co-development, production, and technology access, exemplified by platforms such as the S-400 air defence system and the BrahMos missile programme.
As Russia’s defence-industrial base becomes increasingly entangled with Chinese supply chains—electronics, components, and manufacturing inputs—India faces a new set of concerns. These relate less to immediate capability and more to long-term supply security, upgrades, and technological insulation, particularly when China remains India’s primary strategic competitor.
At the same time, Russia’s isolation from Western technology increases India’s relative value as a defence partner. This creates an opportunity for New Delhi to push harder for joint production, assured spares, lifecycle support, and deeper technology transfer, aligning defence cooperation with India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat objectives. Strategic autonomy, in this context, is not about rejecting partners, but about avoiding single-source dependence.
Why This Matters for India
A Russia economically tethered to China inevitably has reduced strategic flexibility. While Moscow continues to value its relationship with New Delhi, growing dependence on Beijing may constrain its room to manoeuvre where Chinese and Indian interests diverge—particularly in the Indo-Pacific and continental Asia.
This reinforces the logic of India’s multi-alignment strategy. Unlike bloc-based alignments, India’s partnerships are interest-driven and diversified, allowing it to engage Russia, compete with China, and cooperate with the West without being locked into any single axis.
India can also play a limited but meaningful role in offering Russia alternatives—especially in energy trade, pharmaceuticals, fertilisers, and defence co-production—thereby modestly diluting Moscow’s over-reliance on China.
China’s Hidden Risks: Learning Curves and Exposure
While China currently benefits from its leverage over Russia, the relationship is not without risk for Beijing. Deep defence-industrial proximity accelerates PLA learning curves, exposing Chinese engineers and military planners to Russian operational doctrines, system integration practices, and battlefield lessons. While this knowledge transfer may strengthen China in the short term, it also ties Chinese platforms more closely to Russian design legacies.
There are also persistent concerns around reverse engineering and technology diffusion, which could complicate China’s own push for defence innovation and export credibility. More broadly, excessive association with a sanctioned, economically constrained Russia increases China’s exposure to secondary sanctions and strains its already delicate relationships with Europe and parts of the Global South.
A weakened Russia, moreover, is a less reliable strategic partner—potentially turning Chinese leverage into long-term liability.
China–Russia economic interdependence offers short-term insulation but embeds long-term asymmetry. For Russia, dependence narrows strategic choices. For China, leverage comes with exposure. For India, the shifting balance offers both cautionary lessons and strategic openings—particularly in defence industrial cooperation and economic diversification.
In a world where power increasingly flows through supply chains rather than alliances, the decisive advantage lies with those who retain optionality. On that measure, India remains better positioned than either of its Eurasian neighbours.
