Bangladesh’s sudden fondness for Pakistan, abetted by China’s not-so-subtle elbowing of India, looks less like bold statecraft and more like a geopolitical trust fall—performed without checking who’s actually standing behind. Dhaka calls it “strategic diversification.” New Delhi reads it as a raised eyebrow. Beijing reads it as a chess move. Islamabad reads it as a redemption arc. Washington, meanwhile, reads the room and quietly sharpens its talking points about “rules-based order.”
Start with the obvious: Pakistan. For Bangladesh, warming up to Islamabad is pitched as maturity—proof that history no longer dictates policy. Fair enough. But maturity also involves pattern recognition. Pakistan’s foreign policy toolkit is heavy on symbolism and light on sustained delivery. Friendship here often arrives with photo-ops, security whispers, and an unspoken expectation of alignment—especially when China is underwriting the ambience. The risk for Dhaka isn’t the handshake; it’s the bill that arrives later.
Then there’s China, playing its favourite game: Irritate India Without Saying India. Beijing’s encouragement of Bangladesh-Pakistan bonhomie isn’t about South Asian harmony; it’s about geometry. China prefers triangles where India is the obtuse angle—CPEC in Pakistan, ports and projects in Bangladesh, and a narrative that frames Beijing as the indispensable connector. The message is simple: India’s neighbourhood can be plural, and China can be central. That’s great for leverage. Less great for the smaller states whose autonomy becomes collateral.
India, for its part, has invested years—and real money—in stabilizing relations with Bangladesh: trade access, power links, transit, and a delicate handling of historical sensitivities. When Dhaka flirts with Islamabad under Beijing’s watchful eye, it risks fraying a relationship that actually pays dividends. India may not slam doors, but it knows how to slow corridors, delay enthusiasm, and suddenly remember its many domestic constituencies that dislike being surprised.
Why might this be a disadvantage to Bangladesh? Because strategic hedging works best when your hedges don’t argue with each other. China-backed overtures toward Pakistan complicate Dhaka’s most reliable economic and geographic reality: India is next door, the largest market access point, and a critical energy and transit partner. Add to that the United States—Bangladesh’s major export destination—whose patience with China’s expanding footprint is finite. Washington doesn’t demand exclusivity, but it does notice patterns. And patterns shape trade preferences, security cooperation, and diplomatic warmth.
The geopolitical matrix, simplified:
- China wants influence without responsibility, leverage without blame, and neighbors who keep India guessing.
- Pakistan wants relevance, validation, and allies that dilute its isolation—especially when China is the introducer.
- India wants predictability on its eastern flank and will quietly recalibrate when surprised.
- The United States wants stability, open sea lanes, and fewer Chinese flags on strategic infrastructure—while keeping Bangladesh comfortably non-hostile.
- Bangladesh wants growth, autonomy, and options—without choosing sides.
The trouble is that options become liabilities when they look like alignments. Dhaka’s best play has always been quiet competence: trade-first diplomacy, balanced relationships, and an allergy to grandstanding. Palling around with Pakistan, under China’s enthusiastic applause, risks turning Bangladesh from a pragmatic balancer into a convenient pawn. In geopolitics, being everyone’s friend is admirable—until it starts looking like everyone’s experiment.
